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Abstract 
 
The Role of Working Memory, Self-Regulation, and Mindfulness in 
Multitasking Performance 
 
Bridget Ann McGinn, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Diane Schallert 
 
Abstract: This report lays out the ways in which multitasking has been defined 
and the component pieces of the process that can be improved. Changes to self-
regulation, working memory, and heuristic thinking may lead to increased multitasking 
performance. Although working memory training has been varied in its results, the 
centrality of working memory capacity to task switching remains clear. Goal setting and 
goal monitoring might function to lower the cognitive load required for performing 
multiple interleaved tasks by helping to maintain conscious focus on the desired outcome. 
Additionally, mindfulness training has been shown to improve many of the cognitive 
functions involved in multitasking, and therefore it remains an area ripe for future 
research.  
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Chapter 1: What is multitasking? 
 
The concept of multitasking has become a controversial topic particularly in our 
digital age. The term has risen to prominence in the digital age due to its origin in 
computer science. Multitasking was used to describe the abilities of computers to perform 
many tasks at once. The word was adopted to describe the human mind, but the meaning 
has become blurred from more colloquial discussion to its use in cognitive science. This 
chapter serves to differentiate the varied definitions of multitasking. Without a clearly 
defined meaning, discourses about multitasking conflate the issues of productivity and 
attention that are specific to different types of multitasking.  
A plethora of research on multitasking has examined its effects on productivity. 
Generally, empirical research supports the notion that multitasking, for instance while 
studying or listening to lectures, decreases performance outcomes like reading 
comprehension or GPA. Moreover, this research supports arguments that regular 
multitaskers are likely to have larger deficits in performance than those who multitask 
less (Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, 2014). Researchers found that high media 
multitaskers less selectively allow information into working memory, thereby allowing 
greater distractibility (Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009). These types of findings have led 
educators to want to reduce multitasking in order to increase student outcomes. However, 
the decision to do so based on these findings represents an oversimplification of the 
research findings and the concept of multitasking itself.  
Other researchers have discussed situational variation in terms of whether 
multitasking will be effective. Many have acknowledged the inevitability of multitasking 
instead of focusing on findings showing multitasking to be less effective. When 
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multitasking is not broadly pinned as a bad habit with only negative outcomes, the ways 
in which it can be beneficial and the ways in which it might be best used or improved can 
be uncovered.  For instance, although it is widely understood that tasks or combinations 
of tasks that overextend working memory will be less successful than those that do not, 
multitasking can assuage the boredom from a low arousal activity enough to have 
positive effects on productivity (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012). 
Further, research supports the notion that multitasking can spark creativity. In 
their study, Madjar and Shalley (2008) found that participants demonstrated their highest 
levels of creativity when they had goals for their tasks and had the discretion to switch 
between tasks. They suggested that the combination of focused analytical processes, 
when on task, and less focused processes, when completing a secondary or tertiary task, 
work in tandem for optimal creativity. The authors found that task goals lead to more 
focused attention on those tasks, and the discretion to task switch prevents cognitive 
exhaustion from that singular focus. Additionally, it is often the case that there is less 
time to accomplish tasks than they require. Multitasking may be the only path to an 
outcome in which all tasks are attempted to some extent.  
Determining the measure of performance, therefore, seems to be a central 
component of assessing and improving upon multitasking. A helpful distinction that 
examines the seeming paradox between the experience of being more successful when 
multitasking and the continuous onslaught of research that cites the inability for a person 
to perform equivalently while multitasking and while monotasking is elucidated by Adler 
and Benbunan-Fich (2012). The authors wrote that when “performance is measured with 
productivity, different multitasking levels are associated with an inverted-U curve where 
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medium multitaskers perform significantly better than both high and low multitaskers” 
(Adler, 2012, p.156). This description is in line with the experience of balancing several 
tasks and being more effective overall than when you limit yourself to only one. The 
authors go on to say that when “performance is measured with accuracy of results, the 
relation is a downward sloping line, in which increased levels of multitasking lead to a 
significant loss in accuracy.”(Adler, 2012, p. 166) This is to say that pure accuracy, 
which is not always the objective, is always diminished the more that a person’s focus is 
diluted with several tasks. 
The more people avoid task switching and maintain focus, the more they are able 
to improve accuracy. However, even when people are asked only to remain on a single 
task, attention will falter. Even without secondary tasks, pilots told to monitor controls 
repeatedly exhibited mind wandering and distraction (Casner & Schooler, 2015). With 
this in mind, even single tasks have an attentional decay. Once attention has decayed 
significantly on a single task, adding a secondary task may actually refocus attention and 
improve both accuracy and productivity.  
The Spectrum of Multitasking 
If a person is presented with several tasks to complete within an hour they can 
take one of several approaches. They can focus on and complete each task in its entirety 
one after the next, a sequential strategy. They can try to concurrently complete the tasks, 
in parallel, but would be limited by their working memory capacity. Or, they can 
interleave tasks, making progress on one and then switching to another and back again. 
All of these paths to completion might be called multitasking because the person is 
completing multiple tasks in a short interval of time. However, some might argue that the 
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first strategy should not be considered multitasking because it is successively completing 
several tasks. This though is really just an order of magnitude difference. The person is 
task-switching once every 15 minutes rather than once every 5 minutes. Additionally, if 
the tasks are interwoven in any way or refer back to each other, the sequential strategy 
most likely would become a version of the interleaved strategy.    
The second strategy, that of simultaneously completing tasks, most likely would 
fall in one of two categories. Either what is happening is actually rapid task switching, 
attending to each component task back and forth second to second, or the two tasks could 
better be characterized as a single task because each task works toward the same goal and 
does not use the entirety of working memory.  
The latter situation raises the question of what defines a task. If we don’t consider 
simultaneously breathing and walking multitasking, where do we draw the line? Poposki 
& Oswald (2010) defined a task as a “discrete set of activities engaged in for the purposes 
of attaining a goal” (p. 250). The component of goals is a central point to defining tasks 
as is the concept of cognitive load. Cognitive load is the mental effort being used in 
working memory. A further way of distinguishing tasks then would be based on the 
amount of cognitive load they require. An example of how these two pieces interplay 
would be organizing for a party. Although the component parts of preparing for a party 
have a singular goal, the cognitive load required for baking a cake, decorating the house, 
and making a playlist is beyond that of a single task. Conversely, if someone were to 
listen to a podcast while doing the dishes they could distinguish two goals, but together 
they may not reach the maximum capacity of working memory, and therefore that would 
not necessarily constitute task switching, similar to dancing and listening to music. 
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Instead, this behavior could be considered a complex action when a task is defined as 
something that requires a higher portion of working memory than activities that could be 
easily done concurrently.  
Looked at in this way, these different categories of multitasking could actually all 
fall under the “interleaved” strategy with the difference between types of multitasking 
being a continuum of the time spent on each task before switching. Therefore the 
interleaved strategy for completing tasks will be part of the definition for multitasking in 
this paper. Additionally, the way in which task is defined is important to the definition of 
multitasking in this paper. What goal defines the importance of a given task? How much 
of a person’s working memory capacity (WMC) will be used? Below is a chart that 
clarifies several of the types of multitasking that arise from these distinctions. Ways to 
optimize performance in all of these types of multitasking will be laid out in this paper.  
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Table 1. Time and Goals in Multitasking 
Time Goals Example How Why 
Concurrent/parallel 
(must be two 
things below the 
threshold of 
WMC) 
Same Doing a 
tour of a 
city by 
Segway 
Both tasks require less 
than the full WMC. 
This is also a “complex 
action” or a task that requires 
multiple modalities.  
Interleaved task-
switching (quick) 
Same Note-
taking in a 
lecture 
You quickly switch your 
attention between 
writing and listening. 
This is in order to best reach 
the overall goal of 
comprehending and 
remembering the lecture. 
Perhaps you could perform 
better on a test of lecture 
comprehension by simply 
listening, but you may not 
remember it weeks later 
without notes.  
Interleaved Task-
switching (slow) 
Same Preparing 
for a party 
You have a complex 
goal and many steps to 
get there. You juggle the 
intersecting time 
constraints of all aspects 
of the complex goal. 
Perceptual grouping serves to 
create an overarching goal, 
with which one would 
organize and allocate time and 
energy to each subtask.  
Concurrent/ 
parallel  (must be 
two things below 
the threshold of 
WMC) 
Competing Listening 
to a 
podcast 
while 
doing 
dishes 
Both tasks require less 
than the full WMC. 
To avoid the boredom of a 
single task or to more 
effectively use the empty 
space in WMC. 
Interleaved Task-
switching (quick) 
Competing Texting 
while in a 
lecture 
You quickly switch 
focus between texting 
and lecture listening 
which could jeopardize 
successful 
comprehension if the 
material is complex. 
Conversely, the student 
may task switch only 
during lulls in the 
lecture.  
To avoid the boredom of a 
single task or to manage 
competing goals. 
Interleaved Task-
switching (slow) 
Competing Writing a 
paper and 
finishing a 
problem 
set for 
math 
You switch between 
these tasks when you hit 
a low point in focus or 
when the urgency of one 
goal supersedes the 
other.  
To manage competing goals.  
Complex identity Competing Doctor 
and 
mother 
The delays between the 
tasks switches may be 
long or short but would 
involve balancing the 
urgency of goals.  
To manage competing goals. 
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How does the time between switching tasks affect multitasking performance? 
How do the goals of each task and the organizational structure of the task switching 
further differentiate types of multitasking? How should task difficulty, number of tasks, 
or individual differences in preference for multitasking be taken into account when 
examining multitasking? This section will address these questions, but it should be noted 
that many researchers take different stances on these questions. Therefore, results of 
multitasking research should be compared while keeping these differences in mind.  
The Process of Task Switching 
 
What is actually happening as we switch between tasks? One central theory in 
multitasking research is called threaded cognition. Essentially the theory is based on 
several key assumptions, the first being that cognition maintains a set of goals that lead to 
goal driven processing given known resources. The second assumption is that all 
resources, which can be cognitive, perceptual, or motor, will complete tasks “serially” or 
successively. These threads, or task goals, do all of the allocation of resources, according 
to threaded cognition theory, claiming the resources until finished and the next thread 
pulls for the resource (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). The fact that this theory contends that 
individual threads pull for resources rather than being allocated by central executive 
commands raises the centrality of task-level goals in propelling behavior.  
When resources shift away from a task, there must be a system for maintaining 
the process in memory. There is a conscious process of rehearsal that people use when 
they successfully task switch. Metaphorically, a rehearsal would be a bookmark we use to 
hold our place in a task while we begin to work on a secondary task. An example would 
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be if someone were playing a video game (primary task) and then decided to go help a 
friend with moving a piece of furniture (secondary task). The person would rehearse their 
place in the video game so as to resume it with maximum efficiency. They would 
rehearse the primary task again when doing the secondary task as well if the primary task 
was difficult enough. Then when it came time to resume the primary task, the rehearsed 
representation of the task would be recalled in order to continue the task without the 
delay of having to reorient oneself. Part of the studied decrease in accuracy when 
multitasking comes from the interference of the rehearsal. The cognitive load of this 
rehearsal varies depending on the level of the task. For example, one could imagine that 
depending on the complexity of the game or its story line, the amount of interference 
from rehearsal could vary significantly.  
 One line of research that supports this idea of rehearsal comes from studying the 
differences in outcome when people are either warned that they will be switching tasks or 
are switched from the primary task without warning (Trafton, Altmann, Brock, & Mintz, 
2003). Participants in the no warning group take longer to resume the primary task 
because they did not rehearse the primary task as thoroughly as the warned group, as 
measured by verbal reports.  When a person is interrupted from a task, for instance when 
a person knocks at the door while at work, they lose the ability to rehearse the primary 
task being worked on, and therefore may experience a more significant interruption lag 
than if that person had decided to self-interrupt (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). 
From this line of thinking we can begin to consider the types of scaffolds that 
would be most useful at reducing the switch costs involved in multitasking. Salvucci & 
Taatgen (2008) explained that the process of rehearsing and recalling tasks while 
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switching from and switching back to that task causes interference that reduces the speed 
of the event. Additionally, the cost of one’s memory for a secondary goal causes 
interference in the working memory that could be offset by particular scaffolds.  
Salvucci & Taatgen (2008) also discussed the effects of task relatedness in 
reducing interference from secondary tasks. Related secondary tasks led to comparatively 
smaller interruption processing and smoother original task resumption. This relates to the 
way in which people are able to attend to multiple pieces of information at once if they 
perceive the separate bits of information as a coherent, singular message (Bergen, 
Grimes, & Potter, 2005). This concept, called perceptual grouping, diminishes the 
production and maintenance of a representation for tasks or pieces of information and 
therefore reduces the overall cost on cognitive load. For instance, for this reason, 
individuals would be more effective at switching between two screens of basketball 
games than a screen of basketball and a screen of soccer.   
These findings lead to the question of how perceptual grouping might vary from 
person to person. It also warrants the question of how certain representations at a basic 
level could be taught to learners that would help them to interrelate tasks and concepts. 
How might one’s tendency to group information perceptually lead to an increase in 
performance in multitasking situations?   
Not Procrastination 
 
Another way in which discussions of multitasking can be obscured is when it is 
confused with the concept of procrastination. Successful multitaskers are not necessarily 
people who avoid procrastination. Activities which people engage with to procrastinate 
are often the same ones that they engage with when multitasking. This is most likely 
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where the confusion arises. For instance, when an employee is emailing clients while in a 
meeting, this would be considered multitasking because the meeting will continue 
regardless of one’s level of attention. If that same employee decides to email clients 
instead of working on a report this could be considered both procrastinating or 
multitasking depending on why they chose to email, was it to perform the multiple tasks 
necessary for their job more effectively, or to avoid the more urgent report writing. If the 
emailing was less urgent than the report, and the employee was emailing only to delay the 
completion of the report, perhaps due to difficulty, then this would be procrastination.  
Here it becomes clear that the difference between procrastination and multitasking is the 
motivation behind it combined with whether or not it can be delayed. 
A cousin to procrastination is distraction. Distraction is procrastination when the 
primary, goal-directed task is time-bound. For instance, if one were to text while in a 
lecture this would be distraction because the lecture is not pushed off by the secondary 
task but avoided by it. When the time-bound task is the secondary, non goal-directed task 
then this would be procrastination. If one were to watch a movie while studying for an 
exam, this would be a form of procrastination because the primary goal of studying is 
knowingly undermined by the secondary non goal-directed movie watching.  
Clarifying and separating procrastination from multitasking is necessary because 
multitasking that happens as a result of procrastination is not goal directed, or is at least 
goal subversive. Without goals, tasks become unstructured and unwieldy. For instance, if 
one were to switch to reading the news while working on an assignment, the news 
reading has no bounds by which to indicate successful completion. Therefore, its purpose 
actually becomes avoidance of the primary task rather than the news reading having a 
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goal for its own sake. Procrastination as a form of multitasking cannot be improved upon 
except in its reduction, and thus it will not be discussed further in this paper. 
 
Table 2. Motivation and Classification in Multiasking 
 
 
 
 
 
 Activity Motivation Time 
Limitation of 
main task? 
Classification Possible Cause  
1. Emailing 
intermittently 
while writing a 
report 
Avoidance due to 
difficulty/boredom 
No Procrastination • Task 
difficulty 
• Inability to 
focus 
• Wanting to 
focus on 
present 
moment 
enjoyment 
2. Emailing 
intermittently 
while sitting in 
class 
Avoidance due to 
difficulty/boredom 
Yes Distraction • Task 
difficulty 
• Inability to 
focus 
• Wanting to 
focus on 
present 
moment 
enjoyment 
3. Emailing 
intermittently 
while writing a 
report 
Responding to 
emails in a timely 
manner/balance 
consideration of 
the job 
No Multitasking • Balancing 
goals 
• Time 
awareness 
• Priority 
evaluation 
4. Googling 
information 
about artwork 
while at a 
museum 
To enhance the 
experience of the 
overall goal of art 
appreciation. 
No Multitasking • Boredom with 
basic task 
• Desire to 
deepen 
understanding 
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Task Difficulty 
  
 Another significant variable in the realm of multitasking is the difficulty of the 
task. When a singular task takes all of a person’s attention to complete, multitasking 
detracts from overall performance. When tasks are less demanding, multitasking 
increases overall performance. This line of thinking was tested by Adler and Benbunan-
Fich (2013). In their study, they found that when subjective evaluation of task difficulty 
was higher, participants who were forced to multitask did significantly worse than those 
who did not multitask as well as those who were able to multitask at their discretion. This 
is in line with the hypothesis put forth in the Madjar & Shalley (2008) study that found 
that discretion to task switch decreased the likelihood of cognitive exhaustion from a 
difficult task.  
 Most notably, Adler and Benbunan-Fich (2013) found increased performance in 
participants who were forced to multitask over both those who did not multitask and 
those who multitasked at their discretion when the primary task was subjectively easy. 
This finding underscores the importance of task difficulty in determining when 
multitasking would be most effective and when it would lead to deterioration in task 
performance.  
 From these lines of literature, multitasking is most ineffective when task difficulty 
is high. High difficulty task switching would be most effective with longer intervals 
between switching. In fact, discretionary task switching is normally done at low cognitive 
load points (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2013). Therefore more difficult tasks would be less 
likely to induce task switching.  
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Yerkes-Dodson Law and Multitasking 
  
The Yerkes-Dodson law explains that performance is a function of arousal and 
task difficulty. Performance is an inverted-U function of arousal, with performance 
improving with increased arousal until arousal hits an optimal level. After the optimal 
level of arousal, increased arousal negatively impacts performance. In terms of task 
difficulty, easier tasks require more arousal to hit the optimal level for maximum 
performance than more difficult tasks do (Anderson, 1994).  
The Yerkes-Dodson law was used as an explanation by Adler and Benbunan-Fich 
(2012). They hypothesized that cognitive switching costs from multitasking actually 
increase arousal to an optimal state when task difficult is low, presenting as efficiency 
gains by participants. In high task difficulty groups, the cognitive switch costs increase 
arousal past the optimal level and actually present as interference in performance 
outcomes (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012).   
Arousal effects also matter more when people are asked to manage multiple goals. 
Lee, Jin, and Robertson (2012) studied reading comprehension in three conditions: 
reading in silence, reading with a non-tested video playing simultaneously, and reading 
with a video playing simultaneously that would include a test of video content 
subsequently. Their results were that reading in silence and reading with an untested 
video had significantly better results than when the video was tested. Notably, it was 
having the singular goal of performing well on the reading task that differentiated 
performance. When participants had two goals, the diffuse focus inhibited performance 
(Lee, 2012). 
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Rapid, flitting task switching is normally not effective because it does not provide 
a person with a large enough chunk of attention. However, when task difficulty is low 
enough, this flitting might actually enhance performance. As task difficulty increases, the 
level of arousal, which would consist of the task itself, task-switching costs, and outside 
distractors, must be kept low in order to perform optimally. It would follow that research 
in multitasking performance should need to distinguish whether individual differences in 
optimal arousal have significant effects on outcomes.   
Individual Differences 
  
There are several individual differences that have been considered when 
examining multitasking performance. Polychronicity is an individual difference variable 
that measures people’s preference for multitasking, but it is not a measurement of success 
at those tasks.  Poposki and Oswald (2010) developed a Multitasking Preference 
Inventory (MPI) and found that scores on the MPI positively correlated with Extraversion 
and polychronicity. They also hypothesized that highly polychronic individuals may 
derive more personal fulfillment from of jobs with more multitasking (Poposki & 
Oswald, 2010). This leads to the question of whether more extraverted individuals may 
prefer multitasking because of a higher need for arousal.  
Kirchberg, Roe, and Van Eerde (2015) looked at on the job multitasking through 
diaries with the purpose of uncovering individual differences in preference for 
multitasking and the necessity of opportunity and unplanned interruptions in the use of 
multitasking. Within self-identified low and high polychronic individuals, they found that 
in low multitasking environments, low polychronic individuals had higher task 
performance than high polychronic individuals. In high multitasking environments, high 
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polychronic individuals outperformed low polychronic individuals. Additionally, 
polychromic individuals’ affective well-being and self-rated performance were less 
affected on days with high levels of multitasking (Kirchberg et al, 2015). 
Another important individual difference is organizational tendency. Britton and 
Tesser (1991) did a study on college students that found that two time-management 
components, Time Attitude and Short-Range Planning, accounted for more variance than 
SAT scores in cumulative GPA.  Short-Range Planning included items such as, “do you 
make a schedule of the activities you have to do on work days?” and “do you set and 
honor priorities?” Time Attitude included items such as “do you make constructive use of 
your time?” and “do you continue unprofitable routines or activities?” (Britton & Tesser, 
1991).  
The reasoning behind this research stemmed from the notion that college students 
juggle many demands and expectations on their time. Britton and Tesser (1991) argued 
that those participants who score higher on time-management would therefore be more 
successful at undertaking the complex task of being a student beyond the traditional 
effect of aptitude as measured by SAT scores.   
 However what would these management scores mean in terms of juggling several 
tasks in one short period, say one hour? Does management of tasks over months relate to 
how people manage tasks in terms of hours? Terry (2015) looked at college students as 
well and found a strong negative correlation between time and study environment 
management and preference for multitasking. Further, students who reported greater time 
and study environment management also reported a lower preference for multitasking.  
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 Taken together, it might be concluded that multitasking less is the best strategy 
for positive outcomes. However, what really may underlie the difference is successful 
multitasking. It should be noted that Terry’s (2015) study looked at media multitasking, 
which may overlap significantly in its definition with procrastination multitasking, like 
watching a TV show while studying. What is significant to take away from his findings is 
that there is an important relationship between personal organizational structures and 
multitasking.  
Conclusion 
 
Understanding the concept of multitasking and performance requires getting clear 
about what we mean by multitasking and what we mean by performance. Because so 
much of the way we multitask in the 21st century is mediated by technology, determining 
optimal outcomes can lead to better systems for computer-mediated task switching. 
Further, educational and employment outcomes are at stake. People equipped with 
devices are necessarily going to have the opportunity to undertake countless tasks every 
minute of the day, but determining what defines effective multitasking and what qualifies 
as distraction can make the way we teach and organize more appropriate given the reality 
of device use.  
 In exploring the definition of multitasking in this chapter, several concepts arise 
for more in depth discussion. In light of the impact of arousal on cognitive load on 
multitasking, this report will explore working memory capacity and its improvement to 
determine if improvement in task switching might begin there. With increased working 
memory capacity, more actions can be done in the concurrent realm of a singular 
attention span. Secondly, the concept of goals and organization repeatedly occur in the 
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discussion of task switching. Thusly, goal setting and self-regulation will also be 
reviewed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Chapter 2: Working Memory Capacity and Its Improvement 
 
This chapter outlines the way in which working memory capacity impacts 
multitasking as well as ways to improve working memory effectiveness.  Whether a 
person completes a single task or multiple tasks, they are subject to the limits of their 
working memory. Additionally, working memory and self-regulation, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, are inherently intertwined with working memory capacity 
limiting the amount of self-regulation that may be possible. Thus, a thorough 
understanding of working memory and its limitations is vital to helping elucidate how 
self-regulation can influence multitasking performance.  
Across the literature, working memory reflects a variety of influences, but all 
include the ability to control attention. Working memory can be defined as “the ability to 
keep attention focused on one thing and not let it be captured by other events, be they in 
the external environment or internally generated thoughts and feelings” (Barrett, Tugade, 
& Engle, 2004). Once working memory is defined in this way, we can further define 
working memory capacity as the individual difference in space for the processes that take 
place in working memory. Individual differences in ability to control attention define 
when multitasking moves from effective to ineffective. If someone takes only moments 
to center and focus, task switching is less detrimental to overall productivity. Working 
memory capacity is measured in several ways. For instance, individuals may read 
sentences out loud, with each sentence followed by an unrelated word. After reading the 
last sentence-word combination, participants try to recall the list of unrelated words. The 
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higher the recall, the higher the WMC score (Baron & Ward, 2004). Additionally, 
counting span, operation span, and reading span tasks are often used to measure WMC 
(Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, & Engle 2005).  
Working memory is the location of all conscious cognitive processing, and it can 
engage with only a limited number of novel interacting elements (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 
2003). Thus there are two ways to go about affecting the amount of processing that can 
be done via working memory: increase WMC itself, or relegate what would once have to 
be done in conscious processing to automatic processing. Essentially, all human thought 
happens via automation. Most basic processing an adult does could not be done without 
the existence of complex schemas that underlie them. Schemas, which are stored in long-
term memory, contain once automated processes that, prior to automation, would have 
filled most of working memory capacity. For instance, if an adult were asked to write 
numbers 0-100 by 5, they would have to access the schemas for 5’s counting and for 
writing itself. By comparison, most kindergarteners doing the same task would have 
difficulty due to limitation on working memory. They would most likely have to count on 
fingers to each 5, which would consume the majority of their working memory. This can 
be understood by examining the contributing factors to cognitive load that define the 
stressors on WM.  
According to cognitive load theory, cognitive load has three components: intrinsic 
cognitive load, extraneous cognitive load, and effective cognitive load (Paas et al, 2003). 
Intrinsic cognitive load is the base load of any task that can be reduced only by schema 
creation and subsequently schema automation. As we learn how to write, the task of 
writing moves from a conscious process that exacts a heavy burden on intrinsic cognitive 
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load to a writing schema that can be processed automatically. Thus, a consequence of 
learning is lessening cognitive load and making space for more complex processing. 
Extraneous cognitive load is any unnecessary additive to a task that does not impact the 
automation of the processes that underlie intrinsic cognitive load. For instance, in the 
example of writing numbers by 5, if the instructions to the task included using a blue 
marker in the room to write the numbers with but the location was not explicitly written, 
the cognitive load needed to solve for the location of the marker would constitute 
extraneous cognitive load. Lastly, effective cognitive load is the opposite of extraneous 
cognitive load in that it facilities schema acquisition rather than impeding it. An example 
of effective cognitive load would be giving a number line to aid the kindergarteners in 
completing the about task.   
The hypotheses of cognitive load theory fit well within dual-process theory which 
divides our thoughts and actions into two types: automatic processes (nonconscious, 
implicit, heuristic) and controlled processes (goal-directed, top-down, endogenous 
attention) (Barrett et al, 2004; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, & Schmitt, 2008). 
Cognitive load theory proposed that intrinsic cognitive load can be reduced with schema 
creation, and dual-process theory further describes the way in which controlled processes 
(intrinsic cognitive load) and automatic processes (schemas) work together. The process 
of automating tasks is central to the understanding and differentiation of multitasking.  
Considering the dual-process model, both the conscious processing that occurs in 
working memory and the automatic processes that occur in schemas and long-term 
memory should be looked at as potential places to improve multitasking performance. 
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Improving WMC 
 
 Improvement to working memory capacity is one way of increasing multitasking 
ability, as more complex processing can be done within a singular attention span. Konig, 
Buhner, and Murling (2005) found that working memory was the most important 
predictor of multitasking performance, and it explained a significant amount of variance 
that could not be accounted for by fluid intelligence, although the two were highly 
correlated. Their results showed that fluid intelligence and attention were also important 
predictors; however, multitasking performance was not related to polychronicity nor to 
extraversion. These results further underscore the need to research ways to increase WM 
in order to better perform in multitasking.   
There have been numerous studies that have pointed to WM training as having 
effects on WMC. Harrison, Shipstead, Hicks, Hambrick, Redick, and Engle (2013) 
demonstrated that training on complex working memory span tasks led to improvement 
on similar tasks with different materials but that such training did not transfer 
consistently with different working memory capacity tasks, and did not transfer at all in 
tasks that measured fluid intelligence. Olesen, Westerberg, and Klingberg (2004) found 
fMRI evidence for an increase in prefrontal and parietal area activity after working 
memory training.  
 Morrison and Chein (2011) reference the debate around whether WM even has a 
capacity limitation, or whether performance differences might actually be due to 
interference. They go on to outline methods of training that take these different ways of 
improving WM into account. With strategy in mind, there is training that promotes 
domain-specific memory techniques, like word association and mnemonics. There is also 
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“core training,” which uses WM tasks that are non domain-specific to increase the 
underlying WM mechanisms.  Harrison & Shipstead (2013) used complex span and 
simple span training working memory. In complex tasks, individuals must complete a 
simple processing task like a mathematical operation between simple span task items. 
This requirement of memory while exposed to distraction highlights the centrality of 
attention in WM. 
These different training approaches demonstrate the complex nature of WM and 
often serve to obfuscate the meaning of the results. For instance, domain-specific 
memory strategies may actually be a process of automating previously controlled 
processes rather than increasing the space for conscious cognitive processes. When 
working memory capacity training includes strategies like chunking, rehearsal, or 
creating a story with discrete pieces of information, what is most likely occurring is the 
automation of the process (Morrison & Chein, 2011). Further, with working memory 
training, researchers have found improved cognitive control “among a small cohort of 
children diagnosed with ADHD, and a concomitant reduction of ADHD symptom 
severity” (Morrison & Chein, 2011). These results could best be explained by a 
relegation of more components of conscious processes, which would be more stimulating 
to individuals with ADHD, to automatic processing.  
Dux, Tombu, Harrison, Rogers, Tong, & Marois (2009) studied the effect of 
training in multitasking situations on the neuronal pathways involved. They found that 
training did not divert processing from the prefrontal cortex or segregate task-specific 
pathways; instead training increased the speed of processing in the prefrontal cortex to 
allow for rapid, successive processes. They proposed one hypothesis that decreased use 
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of the attention center of the brain after training and reduction in multitasking 
interference with training can be largely explained by improved performance on each of 
the two single tasks. (Dux et al, 2009) However, their fMRI results showed that this 
actually happened via reduction of activation in the inferior frontal junction (IFJ), the 
area that showed increased activity in dual-task versus single-task trials prior to training. 
The authors argued that this supports the hypothesis that the IFJ is responsible for 
response selection, and training shortens the response selection for each task. Another 
way of understanding the finding is that there is a central bottleneck for information 
processing in the IFJ, and when this stage of the task can be sped up via training, the 
dual-task event can happen more quickly. However, it also suggests that there is a limit to 
the amount that training can accomplish due to the fact that there is a single pathway 
through which all processing must go. Metaphorically, this would be equivalent to a 
single lane of traffic where cars can drive faster, but a second lane will not be opened.  
That WM training may actually be improving certain performances via 
automation could explain some of the convoluted results. Shipstead, Redick, & Engle 
(2012) did a review of several working memory improvement papers. These studies 
looked at the effects of WM training on very similar WM tasks (near transfer), different 
WM tasks (moderate transfer), and fluid intelligence task  (far transfer). Although some 
of the studies found significant effects for transfer of WM training to some of these 
secondary tasks, the authors wrote that much of the has demonstrated conflicting 
findings. The authors’ conclusion from examining the research is that research needs to 
include several measures of abilities of interest because none of the single tests have 
shown an undisputable ability to be replicated. Secondly, they recommended that the 
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focus with WM training be near transfer to other WM capacity measure, different from 
the method of training, and WM training should first impact WM and subsequently fluid 
intelligence or attention. Lastly, they argued that studies should use an active rather than 
no contact control group and that raters should be blind to the condition assignment.  
From all the conflicting evidence, it can be assumed that increases to WMC 
should be looked at with cautionary eyes. Thus, a focus on improving working memory 
capacity should be a future pursuit but not the primary way for improving multitasking 
performance. Instead, reduction of the cognitive load on working memory through 
automaticity should be a more central emphasis for improving multitasking performance.  
Dysfunctional Automation 
If working memory capacity refers to one’s ability to give attention to what it is 
important and to suppress the unimportant, the process of consciously developing and 
perhaps reworking created schemas is vital. As mentioned, working memory capacity is 
something that can vary person to person. Someone with a large WMC has more “space” 
to work on controlled processes than someone with a lower WMC. That is, if someone is 
tasked with something complex like running a company with 1000 employees, there is 
more than enough processing that could be done in a conscious way, but the person must 
relegate some of these processes to the automated section of our brain because there is 
too much to do. The automated processing depends on stereotypes and previous patterns 
to work, which may be ideal for driving, but may be less so in other settings.  
One reason for this is that in controlled processes a person can compare their pre-
set goals with actual outcomes. Therefore, in controlled processes we can re-evaluate, 
fine-tune, and work toward goals. Automated processes may work seamlessly at times, 
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but the challenge is creating better automated processes. Because automated processes 
depend on the patterns we develop while we consciously process when there is less vying 
for our attention, those conscious processes end up having a multiplied impact. Deliberate 
work in the preceding conscious  processes will lead to automated processes that work 
well and are aligned with a person’s larger goals.  
The larger one’s WMC the more that can be done consciously, which presumably 
leads to better multitasking results as dependence on automation is less central. For 
instance, Hofmann & Gschwendner (2008) wrote that consumption of tempting food 
happened more often in people with lower working memory capacity.  Automatic 
attitudes toward the temptation had a strong influence on behavior for individuals with 
lower WMC. Controlled dispositions such as explicit attitudes and self-regulatory goals 
are more effective in guiding high WMC participants.  
 Learning new things is dependent on working memory whereas habit formation 
is less dependent on working memory (Lin, Robertson, & Lee, 2009). New tasks require 
a higher cognitive load, so once a particular task is mastered, it has a lesser effect on 
cognitive load and thus working memory. Increased automatization decreases the 
difficulty of a task and allows the executive control to re-allocate attentional resources 
(Macnamara, 2012). Cognitive load is steepest when learning new tasks that have not yet 
been automated (Feldon, 2007).  
Feldon (2007) reported that more experienced teachers are relieved of many 
aspects of cognitive load that new teachers experience as mentally taxing. Because 
teaching is an inherently multitasking oriented career, this example is one in which 
positive and negative forms of automation can be distinguished. In the case of teaching, 
26 
 
certain aspects of classroom management or content understanding would become 
automated over time to allow teachers to open up space within their working memory for 
other processes. Moving these processes from intrinsic cognitive load to schemas enables 
experienced teachers to demonstrate enhanced multitasking ability. This research helps to 
reveal that “tasks” that originally placed heavy burdens on cognitive load could 
eventually become as automated as gum chewing.  
On the other hand, some experienced teachers may have automated certain 
processes that negatively impact their teaching. For instance, if due to high cognitive 
demands, a teacher automated stereotypes as a component of classroom management or 
misconceptions as a component of content knowledge then these schemas would become 
more deeply entrenched in the teacher’s behavior than controlled processes would have 
been. Based on an unconscious schema, these adverse behaviors are more difficult to 
change.  
Voss, Prakash, Erickson, Boot, and Basak (2012) looked at novice videogame 
players learning a new game. One group was asked to focus on all aspects of the game 
during learning and the other was told to focus on improving separate components of 
gameplay in the context of the game as a whole. They found that the second group, which 
was focusing on separately learning each skill in the game, learned most.  This study took 
a multitasking event and showed that providing a strategy that prioritized “variable 
priority” training, thereby combining emphasis and integration, enabled formation of 
efficient, automatic schemas to initially effortful pieces of the task. This strategy for 
automaticity induction is telling. When each component piece of a complex task, like the 
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teaching example, is consciously and deliberately focused on, the automation is more 
likely to be functional and thorough. 
Clearly, automation can be maladaptive in certain circumstances. When 
interacting with people, automated reactions almost always mean that we are stereotyping 
and not examining the ways in which a situation differs from previous ones. Conway and 
Kane (2005) explained this well, writing that “the solution to life’s problems often 
requires that such automatically elicited thoughts, associations, and captured attention be 
resisted and thought be directed or controlled” (p.777). Mindfulness, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, allows people to practice and get into the habit of actually 
consciously experiencing tasks that have been automated.  
We will never be able to compare the outcomes in an automated process with our 
goals, but not all components of a multitasking event require such a comparison. 
Therefore, in a multitasking situation, we might consciously consider which aspects can 
be automated and which should be kept in working memory. For instance, in writing an 
essay, we clearly would want the physical act of typing to be automated, and perhaps 
sentence structure or paragraph organization, but the content should be kept in controlled 
processing.  
As evidenced here, automaticity is one way in which multitasking ability can 
increase.  However, automating particular processes may be at the expense of explicit 
memory, and by extension learning, in which case the automation and subsequent ability 
to multitask might be detrimental (Judd & Kennedy, 2011). The compelling part of this 
research is that those with higher WMC actually use more controlled processes in 
decision making. Conversely we see that automaticity is essential for increasing 
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performance on complex tasks. This is why a conscious decision making process is 
necessary to move something from controlled to automatic in a thoughtful way, in a way 
that allows certain important processes to be maintained in conscious awareness and 
disallows negative stereotypes.  
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Chapter 3: Self-Regulation and Goal-setting 
 
All task performance, including juggling several tasks at once, requires self-
regulation. Self-regulation can be broken into three components: goal-setting, 
development of strategies for achieving the goals, and metacognitive awareness that 
monitors the progress toward those goals. Self-observation serves at least two of these 
functions in the process of self-regulation. It provides the information needed for setting 
realistic goals and for evaluating one’s progress toward them (Bandura, 1991). When 
people monitor their performance they set goals of progressive improvement, even when 
there is no external directive. This chapter aims to examine the ways in which self-
regulation, goal setting and goal monitoring in particular, facilitates successful balancing 
and completion of several tasks.  
Self-regulation is a complex term, which has been argued not to be complete with 
the three components listed above. Zimmerman (1995) argued that self-regulation also 
necessitates a degree of self-efficacy and personal agency, as well as the motivational 
components of those constructs. That self-regulation could improve with scaffolding 
around goal setting and metacognition alone would undermine the Social Cognitive 
Theory (SCT) of self-regulation that was proposed by Bandura (1991). The self-efficacy 
component of SCT can be defined as a person’s belief about their ability to exercise 
control over the way they function. Self-efficacy both precedes and follows goal setting. 
For instance, the choices we make and the goals we set are based on this belief about 
oneself, and the way in which we follow through on the goals we set is also determined 
significantly by this self-perception (Bandura, 1991). Much research has been done on 
processes for increasing an individual’s levels of self-efficacy, and like all productive 
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task completion, it is essential for multitasking. However, aspects of self-regulation that 
involve goals and goal monitoring are more central to the discussion.  
Bandura (1991) argued that intention and desire alone cannot impact behavior 
significantly if a person lacks “capability for exercising influence over their own 
motivation” (p. 249). One aspect of self-regulation, which underlies that ability, is self-
monitoring, or paying attention to one’s performance, the conditions under which it 
occurs, and the effects that are produced. Another aspect is self-diagnosis in which 
people recognize patterns in their behavior and adjust that behavior accordingly better to 
achieve goals. The last aspect is the self-motivating function of self-regulation in which 
people set goals for “progressive improvement” based on evaluation of performance 
throughout task activity. These pieces work in tandem to determine the progress one 
makes in addressing singular and multiple goals.  
Goal setting theory 
According to goal-setting theory, the core properties of an effective goal are its 
specificity, its difficulty, its effects on the self and the group, its balance of learning 
versus performance goals, the effect of the goal source, and the role of incentives (Locke 
& Latham, 2002). There is much to consider when effectively setting goals. In 
multitasking, the success of goals is even more complex as several competing goals 
interact.  
Task complexity is a moderator of goal setting discussed by Locke and Latham 
(2002). They wrote that the effect size for goal setting is small when task difficulty is 
high. The effect size, although smaller than with less complex tasks, is still significant. 
However, with complex tasks, task strategy is most correlated with task performance. 
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They also wrote that proximal goals facilitate performance most in complex tasks and 
that those proximal goals may be effective due to their role in error management, which 
is related to task monitoring.  Additionally, there is empirical support for the notion that 
setting high performance goals actually increases intrinsic motivation (Locke & Latham, 
2002). Presumably, increased intrinsic motivation seems to lead to more goal-
commitment and prolonged attention.  
Intuitively it may seem that self-set goals would have a more significant impact 
on performance than goals set by others. However, those self-set goals must be 
appropriately difficult to have that impact. Participants in a self-set goal condition 
performed fewer task-switches but had lower overall performance when compared to 
participants in a no goal condition. Strickland and Galimba (2001) found that the goals 
set by participants in the goal-setting group were actually lower than the scores they had 
gotten on the pre-experimental test. This result should not lead to the conclusion that 
goals impede performance, but that goals actually significantly affect the way people 
perform. If a goal is set lower than the performance level prior to setting goals, than goals 
can actually have the opposite regulatory effect, and a person may diminish effort in 
order to reach the lower set goal.  
Strickland and Galimba (2001) did find results that indicated that self-set goals 
structured participants’ work patterns, with “less switching between tasks relative to the 
work pattern of a group of participants who did not set goals” (p. 357). Again, task 
switching does have an assumed cost. Multitasking is not “best” when task-switching is 
least, as evidenced by the results from a study that found an optimal arousal level 
dependent on task difficulty (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2011). However, each task switch 
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has a cognitive cost with the goal of the left task needing to be continually rehearsed in 
order to more quickly reorient to the task. Goals left unrehearsed during an interruption 
will decay, resulting in longer resumption times (Ridley, Schutz, Glanz, Weinstein, 
1992). Therefore, when unnecessary task switching is reduced due to effective goal 
setting and goal monitoring, productivity is highest.  
Practical goal setting 
One way of setting goals that are more nuanced and specific is mental contrasting. 
Mental contrasting is the process of imagining a desired future and then examining which 
components of the present impede the achievement of that desire (Oettingen, Kappes, 
Guttenberg, & Gollwitzer, 2015). Oettingen & Kappes (2015) wrote that “mental 
contrasting with high expectations strengthens the implicit associations between the 
desired future and the present reality” (p. 219). With mental contrasting, people become 
energized to overcome the present obstacles to their desired future. Mental contrasting is 
considered a metacognitive strategy for achieving better planning and monitoring skills. 
Oettingen used the theoretical support of mental contrasting to test its efficacy in 
producing better time management in pursuit of goals. In her study, she found those who 
were taught the skill improved their time management. In fact she found that students 
who held high expectations, due to mental contrasting, initiated immediate action toward 
their goal, whereas those with low expectations delayed their actions.  
 The relationship between delayed action and self-regulation again brings in the 
concept of procrastination, which was mentioned in Chapter 1. Procrastination and 
multitasking are convoluted, intertwined terms. If successful goal setting and subsequent 
task completion involves the self-regulation skills of planning and monitoring, then 
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procrastination multitasking can be seen as the maladaptive version of successful task-
switching. Additionally, planning has been considered an apt remedy for overcoming 
procrastination. Planning involves setting goals, subgoals, and time structures, and these 
combined can lead to successful task achievement rather than procrastination (Van Eerde, 
2000). This idea further puts procrastination and successful mutltitasking at opposite ends 
of a spectrum when evaluating productivity and achievement of goals.  
Task switching is the moment when attention breaks, and an alert about a 
competing goal arises. This can either be adaptive or maladaptive depending on the 
circumstance. If the switch is to divert attention from a more important task to a less 
important task, for instance, from focusing on an important assignment to looking at 
photos, then it would be maladaptive and detract from overall goal management. 
However, if the switch is to change attention to a competing goal that has a stronger time 
urgency than the current task, for instance, if you were to remember to take your dinner 
out of the oven in the middle of that assignment, such a switch would be adaptive. What 
differentiates a person whose task switches are typically effective and vital and a person 
whose task switches are preventing her from accomplishing what she truly wants? 
Aimless task switching arises from less planned complex tasks. As evidenced by the fact 
that people who are equipped with goal setting and goal monitoring are less likely to task 
switch unnecessarily, initial goal setting and subsequent shifts to adapt to the progress 
toward goal are vital for multitasking success.  
Ridley & Schutz (1992) looked at self-regulation in terms of two processes: goal 
setting and metacognitive awareness. Their experimental design and its outcome 
underscore a fascinating aspect of success in decision-making tasks that I argue are also 
34 
 
imperative to successful multitasking. In their study, they measured individual 
differences in metacognitive awareness and then placed participants in either a goal-
setting intervention or control group. Results showed that those participants who were 
asked to define goals clearly and who also had a high degree of metacognitive awareness 
performed best in novel decision-making tasks. In the decision-making task, participants 
were asked to keep track of four pieces of onscreen information and make complex 
decisions. Although this was not designed specifically to examine multitasking, it could 
be considered a multitasking event.  
Goal setting is not successful without the metacognitive awareness necessary to 
remind people of the goal at certain intervals. This awareness can go from nonexistent, to 
adaptive, to interfering. Metacognition that interferes demonstrates the way in which it 
can contribute to cognitive load. (Scott & Schwartz, 2007) Here is an example of how an 
excess of metacognition can actually get in the way of task execution. In their study, 
Scott & Schwartz (2007) found that students already high in metacognitive skills who 
had the strategies in place to question material deeply actually suffered in terms of 
performance from scaffolded metacognitive aids to processing content information. 
When considering the ways in which increasing self-monitoring helps in the achievement 
of goals via on the spot adjustments to one’s plan, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
certain types of scaffolding might actually be a detriment to performance if it is 
redundant with pre-existing self-monitoring skills. For this reason, improving a person’s 
multitasking strategies must be done via an individualized approach.  
Developed by Shallice and Burgess (1991), the Six Elements Test (SET) is used 
to measure a person’s ability to achieve a goal that involves balancing several tasks, with 
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time constraints and task rules. Participants must follow particular rules regarding which 
tasks can be performed when, self-monitor their progress, and manage these tasks with 
limited time. This test for multitasking has been used to look at variations in deficits for 
frontal lobe injured individuals.  
One disorder for which using the SET becomes an interesting tool is what is 
referred to as strategy application disorder (SAD). SAD presents itself as a difficulty 
performing complex problems that involve goal-related behavior. Burgess (2000) looked 
at multitasking as a prototypical situation that would prove difficult for someone with 
SAD.  Interestingly, people with SAD exhibit unimpaired IQ, memory, language, visuo-
perceptual functions, and even perform normally on a number of executive functioning 
tests. Instead, individuals with SAD have lost the ability to function specifically in areas 
that are vital for multitasking.   
Failures on the SET could not be explained by low motivation. Instead, Burgess et 
al found the work rates to be the same between the IQ matched controls and the subjects 
with SAD.  The authors attributed poor performance on the SET to issues with the 
component of multitasking of delayed intentions. They described delayed intention as 
requiring prospective memory, or the creation and realization of intentions. This 
description is similar to the self-regulation strategies laid out in this chapter of goal 
setting and monitoring. This relatedness again underscores the necessity of these self-
regulation skills in successful multitasking.  
 Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice (2000) wrote about the three 
constructs they theorized enable high performance on the SET. They included 
retrospective memory, which is very similar to the definition of working memory 
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capacity from the previous chapter. Secondly, they wrote about planning which is 
essentially the initially goal setting component of a task. Lastly, they explained 
intentionality, which is a construct that represents the ability to follow a self-created plan 
and follow task rules. These three constructs together allow for someone to manage 
multiple goals and switch between tasks.  
Another group of individuals who have shown difficulty on the Six Elements Test 
are those with ADHD. Siklos and Kerns (2004) proposed that impairment to the 
Supervisory Attentional System, which controls “goal-directed behaviors in novel 
situations, such as goal articulation, plan formulation, decision-making, marker creation, 
and marker triggering” (p. 348) could be a characteristic of individuals with ADHD. 
They went on to claim that most tests of executive functioning fail to examine this goal 
articulation component because the goal of the task is explicitly laid out. The SET, 
however, pinpoints planning, organizing, and monitoring in a specific way. The results of 
their use of a modified SET with children with ADHD showed evidence that those 
individuals were not different in their ability to remember the task rules; rather, children 
with ADHD appeared to have a specific deficit in monitoring their ongoing behaviors and 
generating useful strategies for task completion, as indicated by the decreased number of 
tasks attempted compared to the control group. 
Considering that SET performance requires remembering task rules, using 
working member capacity, and requires planning and monitoring progress toward goals, 
or self-regulation, we need to examine ways of improving those skills. One example of 
helpful scaffolding is simply encouraging individuals to set goals when confronted with 
any task. Goals that exceed previous performance or even expected performance can 
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increase intrinsic motivation. Time attitude and short-range planning, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, have been shown to increase performance in longer term complex tasks 
(Britton & Tesser, 1991). Monitoring goals in a shorter time frame also involves planning 
with time awareness strategies and deadlines.  
Time awareness underlies the reminders that people give themselves to switch 
from one task to the next. Separate from the ring of a phone or an interruption by a 
knock, self-interruptions come about due to time awareness. In their unified theory of 
multitasking, Salvucci, Taatgen, and Borst (2009) proposed a computational model of 
psychological time to explain the way in which people estimate the amount of time spent 
on a task. Then, with the monitoring of time in place, a person can decide to switch tasks 
at a particular time interval, if a plan has been made or if progress toward goals is being 
monitored.   
Salvucci and Taatgen’s (2008) threaded cognition theory posits that cognition 
maintains a set of active goals in a multitasking event. In order to allocate resources to 
those separate goals, maintenance and monitoring of goals as they progress is a necessity. 
When we maintain awareness of goals, we can track progress toward them and make 
adjustments when needed. When goals are set and subsequently abandoned, they have no 
function in affecting performance. Our ability to monitor goals, track the passing of time, 
and adjust behavior when circumstances change or a plan does not unfold in an expected 
way are some of the primary bases for successful multitasking.  
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Chapter 4: Mindfulness and Time Awareness 
 
This chapter will outline the ways in which mindfulness and time awareness can 
influence multitasking performance. With consideration of cognitive load theory and goal 
setting theory, outlined in the previous chapters, mindfulness and time-awareness are two 
concepts that may work with these theories to improve task switching so that it is 
effective and works well with the goals an individual has set.  
Mindfulness is a conscious and regular drawing of attention back to the present 
moment. Davis and Hayes (2011) defined mindfulness as “moment-to-moment awareness 
of one’s experience without judgment” (p. 198). In their review article, they wrote that 
multitasking has been demonstrated to promote metacognitive awareness, increase 
working memory, and enhance cognitive flexibility. These constructs are related to 
multitasking performance, and therefore it would follow that mindfulness-based 
interventions could show improvement to multitasking. 
Ie, Haller, Langer, & Courvoisier (2012) found that training in multitasking in the 
short term produced no differences in multitasking performance. However, they did find 
that trait mindfulness predicted multitasking performance in the no treatment control 
group. These findings mean that a state-based mindfulness intervention did not have a 
significant enough impact on the aspects of mindfulness to result in better multitasking., 
but that the more long-term effects that come from trait mindfulness could.  
In a chapter entitled “The Role of Intention in Self-Regulation,” Shapiro and 
Schwartz (2010) wrote that connections between parts of a whole “enable the parts to 
affect each other’s behavior, but, more importantly, allow the system to control the global 
operation” (p. 255). They claimed that this interactive organizational process is a way of 
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conceptualizing self-regulation. Importantly, in systems theory, systems are understood 
both as the connections between components as well as governance of the entire system 
as a whole. Thus, the systems level thinking needed for multitasking comes not from 
random interrelating of concepts but from the global operation of control and awareness 
present in a mindful state. 
Shapiro and Schwartz (2010) argued that self-regulation involves “attending” to 
whatever may be the subject of the sustained focused awareness. The authors cited 
studies that have demonstrated that focused attention on one’s breathing leads to deeper, 
more regular breathing. In focusing attention, deeper noticing takes place and the 
complexity with which we can understand increases. Shapiro and Schwartz (2010) also 
write that “self regulation is the process through which a system maintains stability of 
functioning as well as flexibility and the capacity for change in novel situations” (p. 259). 
Most important to its relationship with mindfulness is that self-regulation begins with 
intention rather than simply attention. This distinction is invaluable in differentiating 
mindfulness from other states of mind, and gets more clearly at why it is so essential for 
multitasking: the presence of intention, or goals, means that there will continue to be a 
conscious pruning process, through self-monitoring as thoughts arise that will both 
prevent distractions and increase examination of related ideas. 
Levy, Wobbrock, Kaszniak, & Ostergrn (2012) compared multitasking behavior 
among participants in a control group, participants who did an eight-week mindfulness 
meditation course, and those who did an eight-week body relaxation course. The authors 
found that only those in the mindfulness meditation group made fewer task switches and 
stayed on tasks longer. The authors did not look at multitasking performance, however, 
40 
 
which has been shown to vary in terms of what constitutes better performance. They did 
find that those in both the body relaxation and the mindfulness meditation courses had 
greater increases in memory for discrete information than those in the control group. This 
finding could be related to similar increases in multitasking performance when 
performance is based on accuracy. Additionally, the findings may contrast with Ie et al 
(2012) because Ie et al were looking at performance and not behavior, or because Levy et 
al (2012) used an eight-week course as compared to a short thirty minute training.  
Working Memory Capacity 
Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti (2011) aggregated 23 studies that examined attention 
and memory. They found that mindfulness training improved working memory and 
executive functions. Mindfulness has a definitive relationship with the controlling of 
attention that constitutes WM in that its practice was shown to improve cognitive 
inhibition, specifically in terms of stimulus selection (Bishop, Lau, & Shapiro, 2004). 
Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler (2013) found that a two-week 
mindfulness training improved both GRE scores and working memory capacity while 
simultaneously reducing the prevalence of distracting thoughts. This improvement 
demonstrates the way in which mindfulness may provide the metacognitive monitoring 
strategy to discriminate between pieces of information that are distracting and pieces of 
information that are necessary for successful task completion.  
Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand (2010) looked at the protective effects 
of mindfulness training on working memory capacity and affective experience in military 
cohorts. They found that the intense demands of pre-deployment training decreased 
WMC, but that soldiers in the high practice mindfulness training group showed modest 
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improvements to WMC. If mindfulness has a distinct positive effect on working memory 
capacity, then it may say something about the relationship between mindfulness and 
multitasking. As they claimed, mindfulness may act as a remedy for “high-stress 
intervals” with “deleterious effects” on WMC.  The effects of pre-deployment may be 
attributable to significant levels of high-pressure multitasking. Therefore, the positive 
effects on mitigating that degradation to WM may be transferable to some of the same 
performance deficits that come from high levels of multitasking I discussed in Chapter 1. 
(Ophir et al, 2009; Carrier et al, 2014)  
Heuristic Thinking and Cognitive Flexibility 
 
Moore and Malinowski (2008) explored the link between meditation, self-
reported mindfulness, and cognitive flexibility. Their results demonstrated that 
meditation and levels of mindfulness have a significant positive effect on cognitive 
flexibility. Meditators had higher self-reported mindfulness as well as more positive 
effects on measures of attention. Although Moore and Malinowski focused on how 
attentional control and cognitive flexibility promoted well-being, these two aspects may 
be related additionally to multitasking ability. If mindfulness can be cultivated through 
attentional exercises and meditation, it would follow that those effects of increased 
attention and mental dexterity could be useful for task switching. 
In an article on the neural integration of mindfulness, Seigel (2007) writes, “when 
we achieve new skills of self-observation through mindful practice, it becomes possible 
to disengage automatically coupled pathways” (p. 260). Getting at the heart of how 
mindfulness training enables increased awareness of one’s thoughts, thereby clarifying 
the process by which one connects concepts, and putting the power to be creative and 
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flexible rather than engaging in mindless meanderings. Moments of striking awareness 
allow individuals to avoid the distraction of subjective associations, and to assess pieces 
of information for relevance. Mindfulness practice supports and increases the prevalence 
of this state of mind. It would seem reasonable that mindfulness practice should be 
considered an invaluable component of cultivating problem solving oriented minds.  
Quinnell, Thompson, and LeBard (2013) wrote about the relationship of 
mindfulness and a person’s readiness to “cross liminal space” or move through the 
process of knowing something as a novice to understanding it as an expert. Mindfulness 
contrasts strongly with rigidity of mind, and therefore opens a person up to exploring 
relationships between concepts and away from prohibitive statements like “I’m not a 
math learner.” Quinnell et al also stated that success in math does not come from being 
able to perform calculations but knowing when and how to apply those math skills. They 
went on to say that tackling the “rigidity of mind remains our biggest challenge” (p. 812). 
The focus on creative problem solving and higher order thinking associated with a 
mindful mindset may be the solution to a block in math learning, and similarly to the 
challenges one confronts in a multitasking scenario. Another way of understanding this is 
mindfulness as a precursor to heuristic thinking strategies. If heuristic thinking provides a 
generally faster solution to a problem, because a person avoids the step-by-step 
dependence on rules, then increasing automation helps alleviate the cognitive load of 
strategy awareness and increases the space available for controlled processes. 
Although their study found no significant effect of training, Ie et al (2012) found 
that a trait-based heuristic mindset did correlate with higher multitasking performance. 
Heuristic thinking contrasts with algorithmic thinking in that algorithmic thinkers prefer 
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to approach problems using a defined set of strategies and tackle new problems with 
familiar tactics whereas heuristic thinkers prefer shortcuts, estimates, and novel 
approaches. Further, people engaged in convergent thinking, aligned with low heuristic 
thinking, have displayed increased task-set shielding of the primary task which comes at 
the cost of reduced cognitive flexibility for multitasking (Fischer & Hommel, 2012). The 
fact that heuristic may be another word for the automatic processing described in Chapter 
2 gets at why this way of thinking correlates with multitasking performance. Heuristic 
thinkers are flexible enough in their thinking to reuse schemas from other tasks and 
manipulate them appropriately to reduce conscious processing.  
Thus, on one hand, blocking out distractions is a self-regulatory strategy that has 
positive effects on working memory capacity and thus multitasking ability. In contrast 
heuristic thinking is not focus or attention, but rather heuristic thinking is an opening up 
to possibilities and connections in order to solve problems with flexibility rather than 
through an algorithm (Haller & Courvoisier, 2010). To be clear, the type of opening up to 
possibilities that mindfulness enables is not distraction. Distraction, which comes from 
external sources or internal mind wandering, disenables powerful multitasking by 
depleting working memory. The opposite is true of heuristic thinking which, due to this 
increased awareness around the task at hand, allows a person to connect existing methods 
for problem solving and existing thoughts around a subject to be brought to the forefront 
of the conscious mind.  
Relevant again is Adler and Benbunan-Fich (2012) who wrote that “individuals 
had the highest creativity when they had the discretion to switch tasks, and each task had 
a specific goal” (p. 158). Here is the intersection and symbiosis of creative thinking, often 
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measured by heuristic thinking and task switching. Mindfulness and effective task 
switching can work in tandem to increase a state of mind that blocks out unrelated 
concepts and interconnects tasks using schemas and conscious thought.  
Heuristic strategies are often used to teach expert problem solving, but have been 
said to be less effective without metacognitive strategies (De Corte, Verschaffel, & 
Eynde, 2000). This also points to the reasoning that goal setting and attention are the 
necessary structure within which we multitask. A person high in heuristic thinking and 
low on self-regulation and goal setting might flit from task to task too rapidly or engage 
with a task without full attention. A person with high levels of self-regulation and goal 
setting on the other hand might be excellent at monotasking but have difficulty 
integrating the concepts or complex multitasking events due to algorithmic thinking, 
which prescribes linear completion of tasks rather than an interleaved approach to 
multiple tasks. A person who has both high heuristic thinking and self-regulation may 
demonstrate the right combination of skills to effectively multitask.  
Taken together, the effects of mindfulness on a person’s state of mind are 
impressive. The induction of mindfulness over time may positively impact the 
components necessary for effective task switching behavior:  cognitive flexibility, self-
regulation, and working memory capacity  
Time Awareness and Task-Switching 
 
How we recognize the passage of time may be the basis of time perspective 
theory. This paper has focused primarily on the aspect of multitasking that involves the 
focused attention of a singular cognitive load. However, the ability to recognize when it 
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is time to switch tasks is also a vital component of the process. The notifications of 
urgency to switch tasks propel us forward toward task switching in a multitasking event.  
Because what differentiates tasks is that they have different goals, not that they 
require different modalities, the infiltration of the need to address a goal would be what 
causes a task switch. But what determines when and how often those notifications come 
up? The frequency can become maladaptive and obsessive if it causes a person not to 
have the focus to complete a singular cognitive task because they are so distracted by the 
notifications.  
The concept of time perspective (TP) stems from the way in which humans are 
aware of passing time and try to make sense of it.  Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) defined TP 
as "a nonconscious process whereby the continual flow of personal and social 
experiences are assigned to temporal categories, or time frames, that help to give order, 
coherence and meaning to those events" (p. 27). Time perspective can vary from past to 
present to future orientations and Zimbardo and Boyd point out that it is adaptive to take 
on all of these orientations for different events. Different time perspectives influence the 
way in which people act and make choices.  
The “temporal distance” of a task affects a person’s ability to classify its 
importance and relevance. If a person attributes a particular temporal urgency to certain 
tasks, it may be considered an aspect of the goal they set (Stanescu & Iorga, 2015). 
Clearly, temporal consciousness would therefore play an important role in how the 
person would organize, plan, and execute multitasking events.  
Stanescu and Iorga (2015) proposed that a future time perspective orientation can 
actually increase the “individual amount of motivation and effort-expenditure” (p. 12). 
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Demeyer and De Raedt (2014) found that a person’s time perspective had a significant 
effect on the way in which attention was biased, either toward positive or negative 
information, or both. Further, de Bilde, Vansteenkiste, & Lens (2011) found that future time 
perspective actually regulated student study behavior through feelings of guilt and shame 
(introjected regulation), personal conviction (identified regulation), and interest (intrinsic 
motivation). Moreover, the authors found that a present fatalistic and present hedonic time 
orientation related to “more negative motivational and learning correlates” (p. 332).  
Although these studies relate time perspective theory moreso to general avoidance 
or engagement rather than to specific multitasking events, from their results it can be 
hypothesized that having a future time perspective may be related to the concept of 
polychronicity, which does not correlate directly with multitasking ability. This line of 
thinking stems from the fact that people oriented to the future have a sense of urgency 
around task completion that may encourage more multitasking behavior. I have made the 
case that more multitasking does not mean better multitasking. A future time perspective 
that would lead to unnecessary task switching would most certainly mean worse 
multitasking outcomes. However, a future time perspective over the long term, balanced 
with present time perspective over the short term, could create the working balance of 
urgency and focus needed for effective multitasking.  
Time motivates us forward, but stress around time can make attention to the 
present moment difficult. That stress burdens cognitive load and leaves problem solvers 
more distracted than engaged. Research around time perspective theory and task 
switching would give another way to approach workable scaffolds for teaching students 
to juggle many activities and classes as well as to help adults manage their complex lives.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have laid out ways in which multitasking has been defined, and the 
component pieces of the process that can be improved via changes to self-regulation, 
working memory, and heuristic thinking.  I acknowledge that monotasking nearly 
universally leads to better accuracy, but that the Yerkes-Dodson law can predict optimal 
rates of task-switching for productivity.  
In the second chapter, I presented evidence for the conclusions that higher WMC 
leads to more actions fitting into a singular attention span, but that the majority of WMC 
improvements found experimentally come from relegating component pieces of a process 
to automation. Increased automaticity leaves space in working memory for more complex 
processes. 
In the third chapter, I looked at changes to self-regulation through goal setting and 
goal monitoring as ways to lower the cognitive load required for maintaining multiple 
foci. Such reduction happens via conscious pruning of unwanted information and active 
reorientation toward goals.  
In the final chapter, I looked at time awareness perspective as an individual 
difference variable worth considering for its effects on urgency of task switching. 
Further, I examined the effects of mindfulness training on improving self-regulation, 
working memory, and heuristic thinking through avoiding urges to engage with 
distracting information and remaining more deeply focused on a given task. 
 There are many areas for future research including additional empirical testing of 
the ways in which mindfulness-based interventions could impact multitasking 
specifically. Still, clarity around conscious, effective multitasking must be found. 
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Multitasking has been conflated with procrastination and distraction, but is simply a label 
put to the way our minds run at all times and learn to automate tasks. In the same way 
that we are learning animals, we are multitasking animals who can take once complex 
activities, like driving or playing piano, and do them without conscious thought. This 
ability encourages multitasking. Acknowledgement of that tendency can help us to bring 
certain tasks back into conscious awareness, like being present in a meeting or working 
on an assignment. Multitasking, when it leads to mindless choices in important decisions 
or when it leads to induction of stereotyping to the detriment of what one would 
consciously want, should be avoided. This is why further research and development of 
the concept of mindful and effective multitasking should take place. Additionally, it is 
only with an end goal in mind that we can approach making decisions about automatic 
versus controlled processing, and which would be better for a given task. Therefore, we 
must think about end goals when determining methods for undertaking tasks.  
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